## IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

IN RE:

Case No. 23-12825 (MBK)

LTL MANAGEMENT LLC,

Debtor.

Debtor.

LTL MANAGEMENT LLC,

Plaintiff,

V.

THOSE PARTIES LISTED ON
APPENDIX A TO COMPLAINT AND
JOHN AND JANE DOES 1-1000,

TRANSCRIPT OF DEBTOR'S MOTION TO COMPEL [604]; DEBTOR'S OMNIBUS MOTION TO COMPEL [638]; DEBTOR'S MOTION FOR A BRIDGE ORDER [147]

BEFORE THE HONORABLE MICHAEL B. KAPLAN UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT JUDGE

Audio Operator: Kiya Martin

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I don't believe there are other issues with respect 2 to the motion at Docket 604. If not, we can move to debtor's omnibus motion to compel plaintiff's firm to supplement their responses to interrogatories and document requests. I think it's docketed at 638.

Mr. Torborg, are you up again?

MR. TORBORG: I am up again, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

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MR. TORBORG: Thank you. Again, David Torborg with Jones Day on behalf of the debtor.

This is a motion directed at nine plaintiff law firms. These law firms either represent individual members of the TCC, have filed motions to dismiss on behalf of one or more clients, or have otherwise been active in these proceedings. I'd like to start with a little bit of histories because I suspect this might be a little confusing.

Initially, we served Rule 33 interrogatories and 18 Rule 34 requests for production. Those discovery requests were directed to certain plaintiff firms and their individual 20 clients. So, for example, the debtor's interrogatories to the Arnold and Itkin firm were directed to Arnold and Itkin, LLP, 22 and Arnold and Itkin, LLP, acting for Arnold and Itkin talc claimants. Some of the plaintiff firms to which we served this discovery objected the discovery was improperly served on them, claiming they were not parties to the motion to dismiss

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1 proceeding. Nonetheless, many of the firms did respond to the discovery albeit largely with relevancy and privilege  $3 \parallel \text{ objections.}$ 

Given the objections to whether they were appropriate parties, the debtor thereafter two days later served Rule 45  $6\,\parallel$  document subpoenas on these plaintiff firms and three others. 7 The debtor's motion seeks three categories of information.  $8 \parallel \text{First}$ , we seek information on the total number of talc claims against the debtor, filed and unfiled, for which the law firm served as counsel. There should be no debate that the number of talc claims faced by the debtor is relevant to the issue of financial distress. Most of the firms responded simply that the debtor already has information on the number of claims 14 filed against it.

That, of course, tells us nothing about the number of unfiled claims. There's no good reason to withhold requested information. It should not be hard to provide. Beasley Allen and Maune Raichle identified the number of unfiled claims for which they serve as counsel in response to the interrogatory. One firm, the Barnes Law Group, argued that it cannot identify how many unfiled claims it has because those claims have not been fully investigated and evaluated. The TCC, which weighed in on this motion, despite discovery not being directed to it, makes the same point.

But we didn't ask how many claims will definitively

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We asked the number of claims for which the law firm serves as counsel. The fact that a claimant has sought counsel  $3 \parallel$  concerning the possibility of asserting a claim is relevant to the debtor's talc liability.

The TCC seems to argue that the number of claims or 6∥ potential claims from just nine plaintiff firms is not relevant because there are more than a hundred firms that have such claims. That may be so, but these firms have taken a leadership role in this case and the information sought is relevant.

The TCC further argues that the Court earlier this 12 week declined to order the discovery sought here. The Court 13 did no such thing. It certainly has not held that the number 14 of unfiled claims is irrelevant to the question of financial distress in the motion to dismiss proceeding. Before I move to the next issue, I would like to address again the suggestion that the debtor should have filed this motion weeks ago according to the TCC. Well, the discovery was not even served until three weeks ago.

At the time we filed the motion, the responses that came in were less than two weeks old. And unlike the TCC's practice, we absolutely endeavor to follow the local rules, meet and confer, send letters outlining our problems with it, and propose compromises. There's no deadline to file the motion. And, again, we filed this motion more than a month

1 to the doctor so I can do this hearing here in my kitchen?  $2 \parallel$  Because they think we have to shorten time. And then they come  $3 \parallel$  before you and they say to the Court, well, Judge, we've got a  $4\parallel$  whole nother month until the hearing. Those two things can't be true, and you've got to put an end to it, Judge. You've got to stop this.

> The motion should be denied. Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

I have a question, Mr. Ruckdeschel. I'm going to ask it of you, but I'm going to hear the answer from counsel for the other firms for whom discovery is sought.

MR. RUCKDESCHEL: Of course.

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THE COURT: If there is an interrogatory or if there 14 was a subpoena served on the firm with the intent of drawing out information relevant to financial distress and the subpoena sought information as to the number of clients who have retained the firm to pursue claims for injuries due to use or exposure to talcum powder sold or marketed or distributed by J&J or its affiliate for which a lawsuit has not been filed, why is that not relevant and why would it be privileged? asking for a number. It's not asking for any communication.

MR. RUCKDESCHEL: Well, I can answer on behalf of myself, Judge.

> That's all I'm asking for at this point. THE COURT:

MR. RUCKDESCHEL: And it's easy for me because the

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1 Ruckdeschel law firm is me and now my wife has reactivated her 2 | license and she's working about halftime with me. God help 3 her.

But I only have a handful of cases. But what I can tell you is, when clients come to my firm and they retain my  $6 \parallel \text{firm}$ , the first thing we have to do is investigate.  $7 \parallel$  investigate what their potential claims are, both in the tort system and otherwise. We then investigate what we believe the relative likelihood of success might be, right. We have to go through all this process with these things, and then we have to make a recommendation to our client as to what we believe the best course of action is for them.

And then, and only then, do they then decide what  $14 \parallel$  course of action is it that we're going to take. And I can tell you that there are often months in between the time that a client comes into my firm and retains my firm and the time that we actually make a decision about what we're going to do because the investigation takes a long time. And that's particularly true in the case of people, women that come in because their exposures are often secondhand, and so it takes more time. And it's often true in the case of people that have more complicated work histories and exposure histories. it's often true in people where we've got to look.

And so the fact that you've retained a law firm 25∥ doesn't mean a lawsuit's going to be filed. It doesn't even 1 mean a lawsuit's going to likely be filed.

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THE COURT: But doesn't that go to the inferences the Court could draw from that evidence or the weight given to the evidence, not as to discovery?

MR. RUCKDESCHEL: Absolutely not. Absolutely not. 6 And there are two reasons why.

One, it's completely irrelevant under the analysis of the Third Circuit in LTL 1, which says, the question here is, is there an immediate financial distress? And so speculating about things that might happen in the future is not part of what this Court's proper analysis should be. So for the purposes of the motion to dismiss, that's not the analysis that 13 Your Honor should be doing.

And the facts that could be hypothesized as, well, if this happens and that happens and this happens, then there would be another claim filed. And then if that claim gets filed, and if that happens, this happens, and that happens, and this happens, that's exactly the kind of inferential chain that the Third Circuit said that's not on the table. That's not 20 what we do here.

So that's number one. It's not relevant and it's not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

But number two is what I went through a minute ago. 25 The fact that somebody hires my firm doesn't mean that I have 1 an expectation that I'm going to sue any particular defendant.  $2 \parallel$  And there could be an exception to that, right. A lifelong guy 3 comes in from Pennsylvania and he worked for U.S. Steel his entire career. And in Pennsylvania, you can sue the employer, right. I'm pretty sure when that guy hires me, I'm going to sue U.S. Steel. But that doesn't happen. That's a rare case indeed.

And so the problem is the fact of retention means nothing with respect to whether a claim is going to be filed. It means nothing as to whether it's more likely than not that a claim will be filed. It means nothing. It's just a piece of nonsensical data that means nothing. In order for it to mean something in this case, you have to take at least three more inferential steps. And so that's just inherently speculative.

If somebody has, and this is the response I gave to them, none of my clients have advised me that I should file a claim against the debtor, right. That's what I responded, and they accepted that. So that's fine. Okay.

THE COURT: All right.

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MR. RUCKDESCHEL: So that's my answer, Judge.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

Let me move to Mr. Satterley.

MR. SATTERLEY: Good morning, Your Honor. I guess good afternoon there on the East Coast, and I'm sorry to hear that you've been under the weather and I hope you get well

soon.

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THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. SATTERLEY: Let me echo some of what Mr. Ruckdeschel has said, and I'm not going to be as long as he is. He made very good points. But I want to start with 6 burdening Your Honor.

This is unduly burdensome that the debtor has brought this to your -- put this burden upon you because it's basically harassment. And they brought this to you claiming they've met and conferred when they haven't. I served responses on May 15th, responses and objections on behalf of my law firm and I produced a document. I'll talk about the document in a minute. But I haven't heard a single phone call. I've been in court in the Valadez case every day for weeks. We've done opening statements. We're putting on evidence against many J&J and LTL attorneys, I don't know, 5, 6, 7 there.

And at no point in time did anybody say, hey, by the way, Joe, you didn't adequately answer discovery. Nobody picked up the phone and called me and said, you need to produce some other document. So I don't even know what letter -- supposedly, somebody from Jones Day wrote a letter to I haven't seen it. I've been sort somewhere busy lately.

So I guess my point is, there's really not been any 24 meet and confer on this issue. And so for this emergency motion advancing to today I think is just an attempt to harass

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1 us and to burn the Court. So let me directly address the three  $2 \parallel \text{points}$  -- the three items that counsel says my firm should answer.

The total number of claims; the first item, the total number of claims filed versus unfiled. In the response to the discovery, I provide a letter dated April 20, 2023 to Ms. 7 Allison Brown and Alex Calfo.

I said, in light of Judge Kaplan's ruling today, at today's hearing -- because Your Honor told us on April 20th, if you intend to file lawsuit, let them know.

"In light of Judge Kaplan's ruling at today's hearing, I write as a courtesy to inform you that Kazan firm's clients will file lawsuits against Johnson and Johnson and other protected entities, but not against LTL Management. Each Complaint-Summons will be served through official channels. The cases that will proceed immediately include at least the following."

And I listed all the cases that we intend to file. Any other case beyond that, is work-product privileged, because, as Mr. Ruckdeschel said, we're investigating the 21 merits of the case.

And there's many cases that we investigate and decide 23 not to take, not to accept. My firm has a history, and Johnson and Johnson knows this, that we represent some of the strongest cases you could possibly imagine, you know, they have autopsies

 $1 \parallel$  or tissue digestions and exact ingredients are found in the  $2 \parallel \text{body}$ , right next to the tumor. We're very, very particular  $3\parallel$  about the type of cases that we select to represent.

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So any client that is not on this list is workproduct privilege. And I would reassert what Mr. Ruckdeschel 6 said about if an attorney, or if a client has retained us, that doesn't mean we're actually going to file a lawsuit. still -- the retain to investigate.

So the total number of unfiled claims is privileged and to the except that Your Honor's compels that type of privy information, I'll have to seek Appellate relief because there's, under no circumstances, am I to turn over privileged information.

The second item that they sought is communications that I may have had with other lawyers regarding this topic and I asserted privilege as well.

Co-counsel privilege, I'm co-counsel with Mr. Maimon. The motion I have represented cases against J&J for years. Any communication I have with my co-counsel is privileged and I'm 20 $\parallel$  not going to turn any of that over.

The final issue is, my opinion about financial distress; my views about financial distress are not relevant. And my opinion about the value of each of my cases is privileged. Now, I did point out in the discovery that I have, they already have the demand letters that I've made on

1 individual cases.

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They already have what's called a 998 filing. 3 in California is actual pleading-type documents that serve upon the Defendants, so that when we win the case, if they don't meet that, we could get costs. And they already have those.

So everything that I have that's not privileged has been turned over and everything they're seeking is either harassment or they're seeking privilege.

Final point, Your Honor. The focus at the Motion to Dismiss is not on Joe Satterley or the Kazan law firm's thought processes about the Debtor or Joe Satterley or Kazan law firm's evaluation of each individual case, because I evaluate cases 13 and I have thought process, that's not the focus.

The focus is on the Debtor and the Debtor has repeatedly said, in deposition, that they did no analysis, no estimates of their liability. So that's got to be the focus on the Motion to Dismiss, not on Joe Satterley's thought processes.

And with that, I'll submit, Your Honor. I hope Your Honor gets feeling better.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Satterley.

Mr. Winograd?

MR. WINOGRAD: Thank you, Your Honor.

Mike Winograd from Brown Rudnick, again, on behalf of the TCC. And, Your Honor, I will try not to tread ground

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Your Honor did question the relevance of all of this.  $2 \parallel$  And Your Honor did say, you know what, let's come back to this 3 after the Motion to Dismiss. And that's exactly what should happen here.

With respect to the idea that the relevance that they  $6\parallel$  purport, things that the Debtor purports is a pretext. know, counsel says, well, we just asked ten people, but we don't have to ask everyone.

If they really wanted to figure out who the entire pool is, they would have sent discovery to all of the law firms. They didn't. And these law firms, they say, well, these ten law firms happen to have taken a leadership role.

These law firms did not sign PSAs. These law firms 14 $\parallel$  did not file claimant lists with the PSAs. They didn't file lists with the 2019. It's just completely apples to oranges.

And even the AHC apparently, Your Honor, has not disclosed, its own members have not disclosed all of the claims.

According to the recent testimony this week from Mr. 20∥Nachawati, he things that the PSA is just an agreement to agree, there are lots of issues to work out. He doesn't think, or doesn't know, if the agreement is good for some claimants, and not for others. And he does not believe that he even filed or listed his mesothelioma claimants on his list.

This idea that we have to have the unfiled claimants

1 listed is betrayed by their own conduct.

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Number 4, Your Honor, as counsel has said, so I won't  $3 \parallel$  go back into it deeply, and let me just add to that other point, counsel for -- I see the hand being raised by counsel for the AHC, counsel for the AHC confirmed as much on the call 6∥ on Tuesday saying, yes, a plan is on file, but as I've said at 7 | the last hearing, we don't necessarily agree with everything that's in it and we're hard at work with the Debtors to try and have an amended plan filed that we do agree with.

Next, Your Honor, with respect to the privilege issue. A claim that has not been filed is privileged. only communications about it are between a client and its 13 counsel. It is privileged, it is off-limits.

There are no indicia of reliability. When somebody determines to file a claim and goes ahead and files it, the counsel is subject to Rule 11, has to do due diligence into the merits of those claims. They are indicia of reliability.

The idea that you can ask an attorney, and to use the words of counsel for the TCC, we're not asking how many claims will be filed. We're just asking how many claimants have sought counsel.

The idea that that is somehow not privileged and 23 subject to discovery would contradict every discovery principle I'm aware of, Your Honor. I'm fairly certain that if I ask White and Case, are there, you know, has J&J approached you

1 about any potential lawsuits; have they consulted you, whether  $2 \parallel$  or not you've decided to file anything; is way out of bounds, 3 Your Honor.

The fact that, and this was in the briefing, that some claimants have disclosed their unfiled claimants; the AHC 6 has filed some, apparently, not all. Certain firms have  $7 \parallel \text{responded}$  by providing some does not impact the privilege or decisions of anybody else.

Your Honor, on the \$8.9 billion being inadequate, they asked for the basis. They were told by the TCC, we didn't have anything non-privileged. The law firms, to the extent that, you know, have given them answers, they apparently just 13 don't like the answers.

Again, damages analyses are privileged. There's not much to ask about that that conceivably could be not privileged, or already in the public or within the knowledge of J&J.

And the same, Your Honor, is true with respect to the questions about financial distress. The motion should be denied because of the gamesmanship, Your Honor, and on its merits, it fails as well. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Winograd.

Mr. Branham?

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MR. BRANHAM: Good morning, Your Honor -- I guess afternoon, now. I don't have a whole lot to say here, except

1 to simply join in what Mr. Satterley, Mr. Ruckdeschel and Mr. 2 Winograd already articulated.

You know, our firm is very similar to them in terms of the types of cases that we take, to the case in-firm, an entire analysis that we do.

And just because we're hired, doesn't mean we've decided to file something. I will tell you that I repeatedly, at least twice and maybe three times in my recollection, reached out directly to counsel at Jones Day, asking them, help me understand what the authority is for you to ask for this stuff. It's privileged; what do you think is not privileged?

And the answer was, they are papers; not, let's have a phone call. Not any of that. And then, you know, we're dragged up here as a law firm and, by the way, Judge, I'm admitted *pro hac* for a client in this, but not for my law firm.

So I just want to raise that because I don't want to create a problem. But you know, the idea that this needed to be done this fast, that it was effectively done, as you've heard from others, without any meaningful meet and confer, and really without any discussion at all or willingness to discuss the privileged and work product issues.

I think at the end of the day, belies what this is actually about, which is, they focused on people who drive hard and maybe that they feel like are thorns in their side, as opposed to any legitimate cases for discovery. And so, I would

1 certainly, on behalf of my law firm, which just all this was directed to, and for the reasons stated by everybody else, ask that you not (indiscernible).

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Branham.

Mr. Hansen?

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MR. HANSEN: Thank you, Your Honor. Kris Hansen with Paul Hastings on behalf of the Ad Hoc Committee. Your Honor, I simply wanted to say one thing which was in response to the gratuitous comments from Mr. Winograd about Mr. Nachawati which really had nothing to do with this argument, but they seem to not be able to resist at any point in time.

If they wanted to cite the full facts from the 13 deposition, Mr. Nachawati's got about 5,000 claimants on file and they were apparently 50 mesos [sic] that weren't put in there. So it's not relevant to this point, but I wanted Your Honor to know that.

I also wanted to point out to the Court again that 18 we're the only party who has filed a 2019. If you look around, you're hearing lawyers say, I represent multiple clients; I'm appearing in the case; I'm making arguments in the case.

And notwithstanding Ms. Richenderfer's comments from the last week about how she doesn't think everybody has to suddenly comply with 2019, they do and they need to file those 2019 statements.

I don't have any thing else, Your Honor, I just

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   wanted to give you that factual background.
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             THE COURT:
                        All right. Thank you.
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             Ms. Jones?
             MS. JONES: Good afternoon, Your Honor.
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             THE COURT: Good afternoon.
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             MS. JONES: Laura Davis Jones of Pachulski, Stang,
   Ziehl and Jones. First, Your Honor, it's wonderful to see you
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   feeling well. It's good.
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             THE COURT:
                         Thank you.
             MS. JONES: Your Honor, just one quick comment.
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11 were referenced Arnold and Itkin was referenced earlier in the
   hearing and, Your Honor, just because we did have that specific
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   reference, we wanted to make you knew I was listening and going
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             Your Honor, after all the comments that have been
   made, I have nothing further to add other than what the TCC has
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   already said, Your Honor. Thank you.
             THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
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             Mr. Maimon?
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             MR. MAIMON: Good afternoon, Your Honor.
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             THE COURT: It's after noon; good afternoon.
             MR. MAIMON: It is afternoon. I'll be brief.
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   think that there's a disconnect here between the Jones Day
   lawyers and the reality of practice as it exists outside of the
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   bankruptcy process.
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My colleagues have explained the process that we go 2 through with regard to vetting claims and deciding what claims are viable and what claims can be filed and the advice that we give our clients about that, which are clearly privileged.

You know, Mr. Ruckdeschel talked about discovery on lawyers as non-parties. We are non-parties. Interrogatories and requests for production of documents are discovery vehicles for parties.

We do accept the subpoena, because we recognize that you can subpoena a non-party, but (indiscernible) asked for documents. And then, I would just raise with Your Honor, Your Honor asked the question of Mr. Ruckdeschel about well, what about just talking about the number of people who have come in your door, or the number of people who signed retainers; that 15 number doesn't exist outside of documents.

And it's not incumbent upon my firm to start doing work and tabulating things. One of the things that we do is that we investigate claims and we also assemble documents. have to be retained in order to be authorized to get medical 20 records for our clients.

We do get medical records for our clients. We give the pathology reports that confirm whether or not they have the disease that might be filed about.

This is in sharp contrast to what a lot of the PSA partners of J&J have indicated in their depositions. We don't

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1 have any confirmatory documents or pathology reports. 2 to get those.

Those are privileged. If a client decides not to file a claim, it would be a HIPAA violation for me to start turning those over. The Jones Day lawyers cite no authority,  $6\,\parallel$  none whatsoever, for discovery against lawyers as lawyers, as opposed to discovery against parties.

And in fact, their application within their motion to not file a memo of law is not, should not be taken by the Court as the bravado that this is all simple, that they get what they get.

It's a recognition, quite frankly, on their part, 13  $\parallel$  that the law does not support them. As Mr. Satterley said, I've litigated cases with him, as well as others who are the subject of these motions for years.

And our communications about various issues are communications as representatives of members of the committee. Our communications with counsel for the TCC, they're privileged and we shouldn't have to start talking about that.

Finally, with regard to the valuation of cases, the subpoena talks about, you know, what is the average amount. There is no average amount. That's not the way the ethical rules that we have to live under require us to conduct ourselves.

Each client has the authority to either accept or

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reject an offer made to him or her and we cannot impose upon
our clients "average settlement values," and we don't approach

-- it would be a violation of our ethical rules to approach a
one size fits all categorization: you have this disease, this
is what you get.

That might be ultimately what happens in a bankruptcy because it's imposed on people. It might be in other types of situations where there's an administrative type of a program where this is the amount that you get, whether it's a tax credit or vouchers or what have you, but litigating our cases, that is against the ethical rules.

Finally, with regard to the liability; liability is not only, and the damages that a defendant owes is not simply, a matter of the medical bills or the lost earnings that a plaintiff has or even, quite frankly, the pain and suffering.

But the liability of a defendant is impacted also by the strength of the case against it. And so, yes, for sure, I have a lot of liability documents that J&J has produced to me, but they produced them to me and they know them and it would fill up Your Honor's courtroom more than it's already filled with boxes, to have liability evidence against J&J.

But I also have my analyses of that in documents. My analyses are privileged. They're work product. I have the analyses that Mr. Satterley and I have worked together; those are privileged.

1 the facts are work product and are privileged and should not be 2 produced.

But I wanted to raise my hand and add that there have been comments made Mr. Torborg that the Plaintiff law firms have not participated in this process in good faith, have not  $6\parallel$  looked for documents that might be responsive, that are non-7 privileged.

And that's just not the case. In relation to communication with other lawyers, communication with co-counsel 10∥ has been well-described, are privileged. But in the case of communications with other lawyers that are non-privileged, I can tell you from our firm's perspective, even though we're not a party, even though we have not filed a Motion to Dismiss as a firm, we took steps to make a good faith review and where there was a communication that was not privileged, we produced it.

So to suggest somehow that there's been an improper approach to this by Plaintiff's counsel I think is not accurate and I just wanted to let the Court know that.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

Ms. Parfitt?

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MS. PARFITT: Thank you, Your Honor. And I, again, am glad that you're feeling better.

> THE COURT: Thank you.

MS. PARFITT: Your Honor, points that have not been, perhaps not been raised and discussed by others, but as Ms.

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1 O'Dell indicated as well, we have taken any and all requests by  $2 \parallel$  counsel quite seriously. That's how we handle all types of 3∥ requests.

We made a search of our files despite the fact that we felt any of the requests the Defendants asked that we had objected to were -- had some type of relevance.

We did not. I'm write down the road from Jones Day and I would have been delighted to receive a request to meet with them and talk with them. I suspect that would have been a very short meeting, but to suggest that there was an offer, there was not.

Also, with regard to investigation of our claims and 13 perhaps very relevant to what we will see down the road -- what our firm does, like all other firms, most of the firms on this recording today is do an investigation of their claims so that, in this particular case, as it pertains to ovarian cancer cases, what we do file are epithelial ovarian cancer cases, cases that are supported by the science and supported by the Daubert ruling of the Honorable Judge Wolfson.

So that does take time, and just because someone retains the law firm of Ashcraft & Gerel does not mean -- we ultimately make an assessment that there is this one that need to be filed.

And so, those discussions, those investigations are 25 all highly confidential and privileged until such time as a

1 case is filed.

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And then, at the time the case is filed, that's 3 public and available to LTL and any other Defendant in this case.

As to the other requests with regard to the 8.9 and  $6\parallel$  any comments, I agree with Mr. Ruckdeschel and others. I'm sure we are all quite opinionated on 8.9 and when given the opportunity, would love to share those opinions with regard to that type of evaluation of these serious claims and a number that would be so minimal in its ability to compensate these clients.

But that said, any and all those types of 13 communications are indeed privileged and are indeed work  $14 \parallel \text{product}$ , as are the financial distress analysis that we, or any 15 other clients, would make.

But I just wanted to, I felt compelled to say, as we've heard quite a bit, the firms that have spoken, the TCC whose opposition we do in fact embrace, I think have been very clear with regard to the type of investigation to make and the seriousness with which we respond to any requests, not only at the Court, but frankly, of counsel.

This matter involves women that are dying, women that have died. And to suggest we would do anything less than that, is an insult. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Mr. Molton?

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MR. MOLTON: Yes, Your Honor. I didn't expect to 3 speak, but I got a call from Ms. Lisa Busch of the Weitz Luxenberg firm who unfortunately, for whatever reason is not appearing.

She had her hand up, but apparently, she's not within 7 the webinar. So she just asked me lest, Your Honor, as you 8 review the documents, to relay to you that they did file a response last night in opposition and she stands on it for the Weitz Luxenberg firm, as well as the statements made by other colleagues as well as by the TCC and refers you to the fact therein that, as well, they were not properly served.

So that's all I have to do, Judge. I'm just 14 transmitting that from the Weitz Lux firm who, through whatever 15 miscommunication was not on the webinar. Thank you, Your 16 Honor.

THE COURT: No problem. I did receive their 18 submission and I hope your daughter's program or event went 19 well.

All right.

MR. MOLTON: Your Honor, thank you so much.

THE COURT: Yup.

MR. MOLTON: Thanks so much for the courtesy of extending this.

THE COURT: No problem.